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Abstract 
 
This paper is a description and summary of existing questions and sources of data on 
stock options with an emphasis on two issues; what are the issues surrounding stock options in 
the national accounts and what value do employees place on stock options?  We survey many 
existing data sources and outline some of the ways these data can be used to answer questions 
about the use and impact of employee stock options.  The data sources include administrative 
records from individual firms, survey data of employee perceptions, disclosure filings with the 
SEC and other government, nonprofit, and international sources.  We explore ways to 
investigate the value of options to employees and their cost to the firms using data on employee 
exercise decisions.  Finally, we discuss the implications of our findings for public policy, the 
reporting of stock options, and how options are considered in the national accounts. 
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New Data for Answering Old Questions 
 Regarding Employee Stock Options 
 
I. Background 
An employee stock option is the right an employee has to buy a share of stock at a set 
price at some time in the future, subject to vesting and other provisions.  The dramatic growth in 
the use of stock options in the past decade (Hall and Murphy, 2003), new Financial Accounting 
Standards Board (FASB, December 2004) standards on how to account for stock options in firm 
balance sheets, new disclosure requirements for highly paid executives in U.S. firms and a 
growing debate over how to handle stock options in national accounts (in the United States and 
elsewhere) has sparked considerable interest in the study of stock options in recent years.  
 In keeping with the tradition of the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) 
Conference on Research in Income and Wealth (CRIW) this paper aims to provide a review and 
update on some important questions in stock options research and practice, explore a variety of 
new and interesting data sets for the careful and credible study of employee stock options, 
discuss implications of options in the national accounts, and provide some new empirical 
evidence on the value of options to employees using a decade of data from a large U.S. firm.  
There are a host of reasons why learning more about stock options is important for firms, 
employees and public policymakers.  First, over the past 20 years there has been dramatic 
growth in the use of stock options for senior-level executives and, beginning in the mid-1990s, 
substantial growth in the use of options for non-executive employees that was only partially 
dampened by the market adjustment in 2001.  For example, among publicly traded firms, Hall 
and Murphy (2003) report that option grants to managers and employees who are not among 
the top five highest paid in the firm has grown from less than 85 percent of the total options 
granted to employees in the mid-1990s to over 90 percent by 2002.  While there is some 
evidence that options to non-executives have become less common in recent years, they clearly 
remain an important dimension of compensation in many firms.  Research on options may both 
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help researchers understand why firms grant options and inform firms about how they should 
evaluate their employee stock option policies and practices. Whenever a firm decides to grant 
options, it must decide whether it is better off granting the options or some alternative form of 
compensation.  In order to do this appropriately a firm must know a) how employees value the 
options relative to other forms of compensation, b) the costs of the options to the firm, and c) the 
relative incentive effects of the options (e.g. do they influence the employees to work harder)?  
Even if the options “cost” the firm more than other forms of pay, the firm may still want to 
provide them if incentive effects or other benefits are sufficiently large.    
 A second reason research on options is important is that it may provide insight into the 
widespread debate about the appropriate method of estimating the cost and value of options to 
firms.  Although there are many strongly held opinions and new FASB regulations on how firms 
should expense options, there is no consensus on a theoretical model and empirical method for 
estimating employee stock option costs to the firm.   Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton 
(1973) developed a widely accepted model used for pricing market traded options for risk-
neutral, diversified investors that has been used (with modifications) successfully for more than 
three decades.  While the same techniques have been extended to consider the value of 
options to employees and their cost to the firm, many have pointed out that the value of an 
option to an employee and its cost to the firm may be considerably different than the value to an 
outside investor (e.g. Lambert, Larcker, and Verecchia, 1991).  Using this idea, Hall and Murphy 
(2002) have run simulations of option values to risk averse senior managers that show 
employees value options at a level that is substantially less than the Black-Scholes value and 
the cost of the option to the firm.  
Understanding the cost of options to the firm may also provide insight into how employee 
stock options should be treated in national accounts and estimates of employee compensation.  
Proper measurement of stock options is important for the valid measurement of the national 
accounts since, as of March 2003, “8 percent of private industry workers had access to stock 
options” (Schildkraut, 2004). Current work on this topic by the Bureau of Economic Analysis 
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(BEA) is investigating major data collection, conceptual and practical measurement and timing 
issues (Moylan, 2007). 
 Stock option data are not carefully collected in many common data sources in the 
United States.  For example, the National Compensation Survey (NCS) considered the 
incidence and provisions of stock option plans in a 1999 pilot survey, perhaps with intent to 
further collect the information (BLS, 2000, Crimmel and Schildkraut, 1999, and Crimmel and 
Schildkraut, 2001).  But, the BLS has not further pursued this path, in part given that there is not 
a standard costing method that would allow employers to report costs at an occupational level.  
The NCS does collect information on access to stock options (BLS, 2007).   
 The first section of this paper briefly describes a typical stock option grant and the 
famous Black-Scholes option pricing formula for valuing publicly traded stock options.  We then 
discuss why the value of employee (non-market tradable) options may differ from the valuation 
of market tradable options.  We will also discuss how these alternative valuations relate to the 
controversy regarding the treatment of stock options in the national accounts.  The second 
section details a set of data sources on stock options within the U.S. and internationally.  We 
also consider how newer data could improve what we know in the national accounts. The paper 
concludes with a case study of employee valuation of stock options in a large non-
manufacturing firm.  We examine the value employees place on stock options using data from 
multiple large grants of stock options to a large set of professional employees in a multi-billion 
dollar U.S. non-manufacturing firm.  We show that employee exercise decisions are broadly 
consistent with employee risk aversion and inconsistent with the risk neutral valuation of market-
traded options that is predicted by the Black-Scholes model for market-traded options. 
Our hope is that our work is a useful guide to researchers, policy makers, and practitioners 
interested in stock options. 
 
New Data for Answering Old Questions  CAHRS WP08-05 
 
 
Page 7 of 46 
II. Theoretical Perspective 
 This section has four main goals.  First we define an employee stock option grant and 
provide some context.  Second, we describe the Black-Scholes method for valuing publicly 
traded options. Third, we describe why the value employees place on stock options may differ 
from the well-known Black-Scholes value.   Fundamental to this discussion are the differences 
between market tradable options, for which the Black-Scholes option pricing formula was 
created, and employee stock options.  Finally we discuss how implications of alternative 
valuations for the national accounts. 
Defining Stock Options 
 The right to buy a share of stock at a set price (the strike or exercise price) can be 
executed by an employee after the option is held for a period of time known as the vesting 
period.  Employee stock options typically vest within one to three years, are forfeited if the 
employee leaves the firm and expire (typically) 10 years after the grant date.  Shorter vesting 
periods and option terms are common among high technology firms and on some occasions 
they gradually vest (e.g. one third of the options vest at the end of year one, one third vest at the 
end of year two, and one third vest at the end of year three).  Finally, employees cannot sell 
their options to a third party.  This limitation ensures that until the options are exercised, the 
options continue to tie worker compensation to firm outcomes.  
Black-Scholes Method of Valuing Publicly Traded Options 
A discussion about the value of options to employees begins with the pioneering work of 
Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1973) who describe the value to diversified investors of 
market traded stock options.  The famous diagram shown in Figure 1 summarizes the basic 
relationship between the Black-Scholes value (BSV) of an option to buy a share of stock at a 
fixed price in the future (a call option), the firm’s stock price and the option’s exercise price. The 
kinked intrinsic value line equals Max((SPt – EP), 0) where SPt is the price of the firm’s stock in 
period t and EP is the exercise price of the stock option and corresponds to the payoff that could 
be made by immediately exercising the option and then selling the acquired share at the firm’s 
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stock price.  The curved line in the figure is the BSV and is the predicted price that an 
unexercised option could be bought or sold for based on the Black-Scholes theory.   The BSV is 
a function of six variables - the risk free interest rate, the expiration date of the option, the 
variance in the firm’s stock returns, the firm’s dividend rate, the option exercise price and the 
current stock price.  Figure 2 shows the BSV values for an option with an exercise price of $10 
that expires in 10, 5 and 0.5 years for a “typical” firm.1  When the stock price is $10 and the 
option expires in 10 years the BSV estimate of the market value of the option is $5.57.  Thus, 
even though a profit cannot be made by immediately exercising the option on the grant date, it 
has significant value because of the expectations of investors that at the end of the ten year 
period a significant profit is expected (but not guaranteed) because of the expected positive per 
period returns over the option’s term.  The market value of the option on the option grant 
increases as the duration of the option increases because the distribution of returns  on the 
expiration date have a larger mean and variance as the option’s duration increases.2 If the 
option shown in Figure 2 expires in five years its value at a $10 stock price is $3.80 and if the 
option expires in 6 months its market value is $.99 at a $10 stock price.  The relationship 
between the stock price and BSV for options with these terms is shown in Figure 2. 
An important result shown by Black, Scholes and Merton is that the market value of an 
option depends on the riskless rate of return and does not depend on the firm’s expected return 
which includes a firm specific risk premium.  The prediction that owners of market traded 
options can only expect to earn the riskless rate of return by holding the option is because 
investors can eliminate the risk that the option will be worthless when it expires because the 
stock price is less than the exercise price with a hedging strategy. For example, an investor 
could buy a “put” option that gives the owner the right to sell a share of stock at $10/share in 
                                                 
1 The standard deviation of the firm’s returns over a year is .3, no dividends are paid by the firm and the 
risk free interest rate is 6 percent.   
2 Because the terminal stock price distribution is log normally distributed, the expected price at the 
expiration date is a function of both the mean and variance of the per period return.  As we explain 
shortly, the per period return investors of market traded options expect to earn equals the risk free 
interest rate. 
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period T.  This put option will pay a profit to its owner if the call option is “underwater” (SPT < 
EP).   Owning this put ensures the investor will make a profit at time T no matter what the stock 
price happens to be on the expiration day.  While firms discourage employees from owning put 
options because these options are a “bet against the company” and earn money only if the 
firm’s stock price falls, for outside investors this example illustrates  a simple way of eliminating 
the risk associated from owning a call option.  The ability of investors to hedge risk means 
competitive market pressures cause options prices to converge to a price that earns only a 
riskless rate of return. 
More formally the Black-Scholes option pricing formula is: 
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Where is the risk-free rate of interest, fr σ is the standard deviation of returns for the underlying 
stock, is time in years until the option expires, and t Φ is the cumulative standard normal 
distribution function.  The model assumes the firm’s stock returns are normally distributed and 
uncorrelated from one period to the next.  The assumption that returns are normally distributed 
means the price of a riskless asset in T periods is drawn from a log-normal price distribution.  As 
the option expiration date approaches, the Black-Scholes line shifts towards the intrinsic value 
line because the chance of drawing a “large” positive return from the return distribution on the 
expiration date declines.   
Why the Value of Employee Options May Diverge from the Black-Scholes Value 
An important prediction of the Black-Scholes model is that a diversified investor will 
never exercise the right to buy a share of stock until the moment before it expires because, as 
Figure 2 shows, at any earlier date the expected gain from holding the option until the expiration 
date is greater than the profit that can be made by immediately exercising it.  The expectation of 
a positive return between now and the expiration date means the Black-Scholes value is greater 
than the profit that could be made by immediately exercising the option and receiving the 
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option’s intrinsic value, (SPt -EP).  Therefore, the Black-Scholes model predicts that prior to the 
expiration date an investor will sell an option rather than exercise it if they wish to convert an 
option to cash because the BSV, the sale price, is greater than (SPt -EP). 
The Black-Scholes model predicts that market traded options held by diversified 
investors will rarely be exercised early because options can almost always be sold for more 
than the option’s intrinsic value (stock price – exercise price).3  The Black-Scholes model makes 
no prediction at all about how long the owner of a market traded option will own an option; it 
only predicts an option will be sold rather than exercised if its owner wants to liquidate his or her 
position prior to the expiration date.  “Early” exercise behavior by employees occurs because 
they cannot sell their options and their only choice during the term of the option is between 
exercising the option or holding the option for another period.   
For some time researchers have noted that the value employees place on employee 
stock options is likely to be different from the value diversified investors place on market 
tradable options.  The major piece of empirical evidence cited to support this conclusion is the 
observation that employees frequently exercise EMPLOYEE STOCK OPTIONS “early” or well 
before the option’s expiration date (Huddart and Lang, 1996; Carpenter 1998).  In the firm we 
study in Section IV 86 percent of employees exercised their options prior to the month before 
the options expired and half of the sample exercised some of their options at least 27 months 
prior to the option’s expiration date.4  Lambert, Larcker, and Verecchia (1991) who, among 
others, argue that because employees are not risk neutral, are heavily invested in their firm (firm 
specific human capital and deferred compensation) and may face liquidity constraints, they are 
likely to value employee options in their firm at a level lower than the Black-Scholes value and 
may also exercise their options earlier than predicted by Black-Scholes.  Simulation work by 
Hall and Murphy (2002) shows that, conditional on a set of assumptions about risk aversion and 
                                                 
3 If firm dividends are sufficiently high, there may be a date prior to the option’s expiration date when it is 
optimal to exercise an option early.  This explanation cannot account for widespread exercise behavior 
over the term of the option and after the vesting date. 
4 These data are for the first large EMPLOYEE STOCK OPTION grant awards made to the middle level 
managers included in this study. 
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the wealth they hold in firm stock, executives valued options at a level significantly less than the 
Black-Scholes value for market tradable options and exercised “early” to lock-in gains from large 
stock price increases and diversify their portfolio.  Contrary to Black-Scholes, Heath, Huddart 
and Lang (1999) find that employees tend to exercise options when the firm’s stock price 
exceeds a target or referent price based on recent stock price highs.5     
 It must certainly be true that for those employees that exercise their options prior to the 
expiration date, the value they place on holding the option is less than the option’s BSV.  Since 
the BSV of an option is greater than the option’s intrinsic value and an employee will exercise 
an option when the profit from exercising early (the option’s intrinsic value) is greater than the 
value of holding the option, then the value of holding the option must be less than BSV when 
employees exercise their options.  This result, however, does not say anything about the value 
of the options held by employees who have not yet exercised their options.  While the 
differences between market traded options and EMPLOYEE STOCK OPTIONS discussed in 
the previous paragraph predicts the value of options held by employees is less than BSV, 
evidence of early exercise behavior by employees only shows employees who do not exercise 
their options value the options at an amount greater than the option’s intrinsic value. The 
decision by an employee to continue to hold their options does not say anything about the value 
of the options relative to its BSV.  Since employees cannot sell their options or use the options 
as collateral to borrow money, they have no market signals that could inform them of the value 
outside investors would place on their options. 
The observation that employees frequently exercise EMPLOYEE STOCK OPTIONS 
“early” compared to the Black-Scholes prediction for market traded options reflects the fact that 
employees cannot sell the options they receive from their employer and must exercise the 
options if they wish to liquidate their position to diversify their portfolio or meet a household 
demand for cash.  This feature of EMPLOYEE STOCK OPTIONS implies information about an 
                                                 
5 Since an employee must typically forfeit her options if she leaves the firm, early exercise decisions may 
also be caused by voluntary or involuntary employee turnover (Carpenter 1998). 
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option’s value to an employee is revealed each period by observing whether or not a vested 
option is exercised.  If an option is not exercised in a period then the value to the employee of 
holding the option and reserving the right to exercise it in a later period is greater than the value 
from immediately exercising the option and receiving the option’s intrinsic value.  On the other 
hand, when an employee exercises an option we know the value of holding the option another 
period is less than what is gained by exercising the option and receiving a payment equal to the 
stock price minus the exercise price.  Thus, the decision to exercise immediately or hold an 
option for at least another period is an indicator of the current value to an employee of holding 
the option relative to the option’s intrinsic value.   
One important implication of the preceding prediction is that variation in the length of 
time until employees exercise their options reflects heterogeneity in the value employees place 
on holding their options for another period.  This heterogeneity in the value of an EMPLOYEE 
STOCK OPTION could reflect differences in turnover intentions because employees must 
typically forfeit their EMPLOYEE STOCK OPTIONS when they leave the firm. It may also reflect 
differences in household risk aversion, the effects of binding liquidity constraints or different 
predictions about the future stock price of the firm.  More risk averse employees may exercise 
early to “lock-in” profits (Hall & Murphy 2002) and the inability of employees to borrow against 
their EMPLOYEE STOCK OPTIONS may cause some employees to exercise options to meet 
family financial commitments (buying a house, college tuition or unanticipated health care 
expenditures).  While these same sources of heterogeneity also characterize owners of market 
traded options, because Black-Scholes predicts owners of market traded options can sell and 
hedge their options, market traded options are identically valued (conditional on the six 
variables identified above) regardless of the risk preferences and liquidity constraints of their 
owners.  Thus, heterogeneity in exercise times is strong evidence that Black-Scholes does not 
measure the value of EMPLOYEE STOCK OPTIONS to employees. 
New Data for Answering Old Questions  CAHRS WP08-05 
 
 
Page 13 of 46 
Stock Options, National Accounts, and How Valuation Matters 
 Accounting for stock options in the United States National Economic Accounts poses a 
variety of difficult issues.6  One problem is that there are, in fact, two types of employee stock 
options; incentive stock options (ISO) and nonqualified stock options (NSO).  Incentive stock 
options are not deductible for the employer or to the employee.  However, when the stock is 
sold the difference between the exercise price and the stock price is taxed as a capital gain for 
the individual (Moylan, 2007).  NSO are much more common and have different tax implications 
for employees and firms.  When an employee exercises an NSO, he or she must pay income 
tax on the difference between the stock price and the exercise price just as if that compensation 
had been paid in cash.  The firm can count a tax deduction of the same magnitude at the same 
time.  
 Collecting options data for the national accounts is very difficult7.  Given recent 
advances in the disclosure of employee equity awards, including stock and employee stock 
options, through the Securities and Exchange Commission web-site, we could imagine that 
collecting timely data is now easier than at any time in the past.  However, there are a series of 
barriers in considering the valuation of options in the national accounts, even with access to 
better data.  Carol Moylan carefully outlines many of the important issues with the treatment of 
employee stock options in the U.S. national accounts (Moylan, 2007).   
 One of the issues is that of timing.  Cynthia Glassman, undersecretary for economic 
affairs in the economic and statistics administration of the commerce department, noted (in a 
paper from the 2008 ASSA meetings), “…proceeds from the exercise of stock options are 
included in compensation estimates for the quarter in which exercise occurs, and the proceeds 
are excluded from corporate profits for the same quarter.  This means that stock option 
compensation is not recognized for some time – possibly years – after employees actually 
receive the option grants…It also means that any divergence between accounting and tax 
                                                 
6 As pointed out in Lequiller (undated) this is also a problem is many other countries.  
7 The Employment Cost Index, another important government statistic, does not include compensation in 
the form of stock options (Ruser, 2001). 
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profits creates a headache for BEA …” (Glassmam, 2008).  Note also that the BEA does not 
produce a single quarterly GDI estimate but many “vintages” of GDI estimates for each quarter.  
This “reflects a compromise between providing timely estimates based on less-than-complete 
data and providing increasingly accurate estimates with lags that reflect the availability of better 
and more complete data”.  (Glassman, 2008).  Another issue discussed by Moylan (2007) is that 
it is unclear when to count the compensation as earnings – at the time of the grant or the time of 
the exercise of the option. 
Moylan (2007) carefully describes stock options do have value and should be treated as 
a form of compensation.  One problem is when to count the compensation.  Some argue that 
options should be counted as compensation at the time of the grant and not at the time of 
exercise as they are currently counted in the national accounts8.  A difficulty with this view as 
pointed out by many is that employee options are subject to vesting and in a sense the 
compensation is not earned until after vesting has occurred.  So, therefore, perhaps the options 
should count as compensation at the time of vesting or some time between the grant date and 
vesting.  After vesting the gains from options could be thought of as a type of capital gain and 
therefore may no longer be considered compensation but as investment income.  (Eurostat, 
undated and Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2002).  Therefore, there is difficulty, from a 
theoretical point of view, about whether stock options are a form of pay, an investment or a 
combination of the two. 
 Moylan (2007) notes that “under most UI laws, wages and salaries include bonuses, tips, 
the cash value of meals and lodging provided by the employer, the gain on the employee 
exercise of certain stock options, and employee contributions to certain deferred compensation 
plans.”  She and others (e.g. McIntosh, undated) note that in calculating compensation for the 
national accounts the BEA assumes that compensation includes the exercise of non-qualified 
                                                 
8 The discussion in the text is focused on options in the national accounts.  This should not be confused 
with recent Financial Accounting Standards Board changes that now require firms to expense (and 
disclose in financial statements) options at the time they are granted.  This differs from the tax treatment 
of options and from the national accounts practice of recognizing options as compensation when they are 
exercised. 
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stock options but not incentive stock options.   One problem, however, is that “there is evidence 
that some states are inconsistent in their coverage”.  Also, and as noted by Glassman (2008), 
the QCEW (BLS quarterly census of employment and wages) are reported with a lag of five 
months.   
One reason properly accounting for options in the National Accounts is extremely difficult  
is the difference in accounting and tax treatment of stock options in the United States.  For 
many years there was a “disconnect” between the valuation of options for tax purposes and for 
purposes of reporting profits in company financial reports.  Given the recent FASB change and 
the requirement for firms to “expense” options in their balance sheet, one would think that it may 
be easier to account for options in the National Accounts.   
 
III. Sources of Data on Stock Options 
Along with the explosion in the past few decades in the use of stock options by firms in 
the United States there has been a dramatic increase in research on employee stock options.  
In this section we provide a general review of data sources on stock options and how these data 
can be useful for answering different questions about their  incentive effects, their value to firms 
and employees, and data that could potentially be useful in the treatment of stock options in the 
national accounts.  We will also try to address whether there are gaps in the set of data sources. 
General Review of Sources of Data and How They Can Help Answer Questions 
We have categorized the types of data on stock options into seven types; i) commercial 
executive-level and firm-level sources, ii) individual firm financial records at the firm level, iii) 
individual firm financial records at the person-level, iv) consulting firm data, v) employee 
perception data from surveys, vi) government and nonprofit sources, and vii) international 
sources.  Table 1 outlines the data and lists a set of sources that have used each.  The set of 
sources listed in Table 1 is by no means exhaustive.  In each section we briefly describe the 
types of data and mention ways that the data have been or could be used. 
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Commercial Executive-Level and Firm-Level Data Sources 
There are at least three available commercial data sources on executive pay at the 
person-level and firm-level that are now relatively widely used.  The first, ExecuComp 
(Executive Compensation data base) is produced by Standard and Poor’s Corporation and is 
likely the most widely used source of data for research on executive pay, including stock 
options.  This source has available data from 1992 – present on the compensation of the top 
five highest paid employees of U.S. publicly traded firms who have managerial control in roughly 
1,500 firms per year.  These firms include those listed in the Standard and Poor’s 500, the 
Standard and Poor’s SmallCap 600, and the Standard and Poor’s MidCap 400.  The data 
source starts in 1992 which was (until this past year) the last major change in executive pay 
disclosure rules.  A wide variety of questions can be answered with these data including issues 
of pay for performance for corporate managers, studies of corporate ownership and research on 
the composition (salary, bonus, options, stock, etc.) of executive pay.  This dataset is perhaps 
the most popular among academic researchers.  Examples of work using these data that are 
mentioned in Table 1 include Bergman and Jenter (2007) who examine employee optimism, 
Chidambaran and Nagpurnanand (2005) who study repricings, and Mehran and Tracy (2001) 
who provide a summary of some executive pay research using data from ExecuComp. 
Two other commercial executive pay sources are Equilar and salary.com.  Each also 
provides comprehensive data sets of executive compensation but have a larger focus on 
marketing to the for-profit firm and compensation consulting market.  These sources are 
frequently used by compensation design practitioners and consultants to help design executive 
pay plans (and to set comparison groups) including detailed equity and employee stock option 
plans.  
One problem with all three of these sources is that they only focus on the most senior 
executives with managerial control over the firm.  If one is interested in the compensation of any 
employee who is not in the “top 5 highest paid” these data sources are not particularly useful.  
They do, however, reveal the fraction of options given to the sum of the top five highest-paid 
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officers so that one can calculate the fraction granted to the rest of the employees in the firm.  
Another drawback of these data is that that only cover publicly traded firms.  Finally, 
ExecuComp is for a limited set of firms.  Data from Equilar and salary.com are more expensive 
but include information from a wider variety of firms. 
Individual Firm Financial Records (firm-level) 
A host of scholars have also considered firm financial records at the firm level but have 
not used the well-known ExecuComp and related sources; rather they have dug deeper for 
more unique sources of information.  We will discuss a selection of these examples here.  
Examples of this include Aboody (1996) who used the National Automation Accounting 
Research System (NAARS) library on Lexis/Nexis in 1988 in a study of the relationship between 
outstanding options and stock, Core and Guay (2001) who study the determinants of non-
executive employee stock option holdings, grants, and exercises, and Carpenter (1998) who 
collected information on average time to exercise, stock prices at the time of exercise and 
vesting periods using data from 10-Ks, proxies and S-8 forms (the option plan prospectus).   
The latter is an example of a study that required the use of significant “digging” beyond 
what was easily available in machine-readable form.  This kind of work is expensive and time 
consuming but can open doors to many interesting findings. 
Individual Firm Detailed Case Study Data (person-level) 
 There have been an increasing number of individual-firm case studies over the past 
decade that have greatly enriched our understanding of employee stock options.  Although 
these kinds of studies have the obvious drawback that the results may apply to only one (or a 
small number of) firms, they are often extraordinarily rich in detail about the firm and individual.   
Too often, economic and financial scholars are interested in discovering things such as the 
“incentive effects” of a particular pay policy.  In fact, the viability of a particular pay plan may 
depend quite a bit on the type of workers the firm employs and the strategy and objectives of 
the firm.  That is to say, a particular pay practice may work more effectively in one firm than 
another, even when firms are in similar industries and employ observably similar workers. 
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 Armstrong, Jagolinzer, and Larcker (2006) study “option-exercise-timing-adjusted” 
employee option valuation models suggested using detailed data from ten publicly traded U.S. 
firms including information on strike price, maximum term, and vesting schedule for each option 
grant to each employee.  Their sample includes several tens of thousands of options.  In some 
of our own work (Hallock and Olson, 2007a and Hallock and Olson, 2007b) we examine data 
from two separate firms to consider the value of options to employees and employees’ choice of 
mix of pay.  Two very important and early papers that use unique data from firms are Health, 
Huddart, and Lang (1999) and Huddart and Lang (1996).  The authors use individual by 
individual option grant and exercise data from 50,000 individuals at seven corporations.  Bajaj, 
Mazumdar, Surana, and Unni (2006) use data from two firms to consider the valuation of 
employee stock options and find that EMPLOYEE STOCK OPTION valuation methods 
suggested by FAS 123R such as adjusting the expected life of the EMPLOYEE STOCK 
OPTIONS and making adjustments to the Black-Scholes value lead to substantial biases in 
option valuation.    
 Again, each of these papers makes a unique contribution and shows the details that can 
be learned from extraordinarily specific data.  However, each study also suffers from the 
drawback that they are studying a very small non-random sample of firms. 
Consulting Firm Data 
 An increasing number of scholars have made connections with consulting firms to use 
data from a variety of firms at once in one study.  These have the obvious advantage that more 
firms are included.  In some cases, there are fewer details than in some of the case studies 
previously discussed.  Heron and Lie (2007) investigated whether stock option backdating 
explained price patterns around executive stock option grants.  The authors use data on stock 
options grants from Thomson Financial which collects information from insider transactions of 
stock and derivative grants and exercises from SEC forms 3, 4, 5 and 144.  Landsman, 
Peasnell, Pope, and Yeh (2006) consider which approach to accounting for stock options best 
reflects market pricing.  They use 1,354 firm-year observations drawn from the S&P 500 from 
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1997 – 2001 from Jack Ciesielski of R.G. Associates.  Relationships with data providers are 
very hard to establish but the payoff from such data collection can be great. 
Employee perception data from surveys 
 One way to estimate the value employees place on stock options is to ask employees.  
Farrell, Krische, and Sedatole (2006) use “confidential training data files” of New Worth 
Strategies, Inc. (NWSI), a national leader in equity compensation planning services to 
investigate this issue.  They examine how a training program may help employees understand 
their employee stock options better. Hodge, Rajgopal, and Shevlin (2006) investigate individual 
perceptions of the value of stock options and restricted stock.  This is an alternative to observing 
actual exercise behavior and is complementary to the work of others (including that described in 
section IV below).  A benefit of this method is that the data are easily collected.  A disadvantage 
is that respondents may not take the questions as seriously as they would if they were faced 
with an actual financial decision.  The obvious problems with perception data still exist.  It may 
be possible to try to elicit employee perception or utility by actually offering them choice and 
observing their behavior.  A recent example of this is Hallock and Olson (2007b). 
Government and Nonprofit Sources 
 There are also a set of government and nonprofit data sources that contain different 
types of information on employee stock options.   Kroumova and Sesil (2006) consider the 
predictors of the use of employee stock option plans using data from the National Center for 
Employee Ownership (NCEO) in 1998 on 600 public and private firms sponsoring some form of 
broad-based stock option plan merged with information from Compustat.  Oyer and Schaefer 
(2005, 2006) have two papers that use these types of sources. Other government sources on 
stock options obviously include the data from UI records that are used in calculating the national 
accounts and the 1999 special survey conducted by the National Compensation Survey. 
International Data 
Although the focus of this paper is on employee stock options in the United States (and 
rules on grant, exercise and taxation of options vary widely) international data on employee 
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options are also available.  Ikaheimo, Kuosa, and Puttonen (2006) examine the “most actively 
traded EMPLOYEE STOCK OPTION companies (14 plans of 6 companies), which represents 
98.7 percent of total value of EMPLOYEE STOCK OPTION trades on the Helsinki Stock 
Exchange (HEX).”  In another study using Finnish data Jones, Kalmi, and Makinen (2006) use 
firm-level data on option plans from all Finnish firms from 1990 – 2002.  Kato, Kiyoski, Lemmon, 
Luo, and Schallheim (2005) investigate 644 adoptions of stock option plans announced by 
Japanese firms following the amendment of the Japanese commercial code in May 1997.  
Pendleton (2006) investigated the behavior of participants in the U.K.’s Save as You Earn 
(SAYE) stock option programs.    
 Data from different countries certainly add to the richness of what we know about 
employee stock options.  At the same time, we need to be careful in interpreting results across 
countries due to the quite different reporting and tax rules on stock and employee stock options 
across country boundaries.  These differences, of course, provide a potential source of 
exogenous variation that can be used to understand the adoption of employee stock option 
plans and the behavior of firms and individuals covered by these plans. There is also substantial 
international interest in the national accounts measurement and timing issues we discussed 
above including as described in Lequiller (2002). 
Gaps in the Set of Option Data and What to Do 
Although there are many excellent data sources on stock options, there are significant 
gaps.  These include the difficulties with trying to gain access to firm financial records, difficulty 
in collecting publicly available data, problems in reporting and understanding by individuals, and 
the issues of timing and measurement with the national accounts.  
Many significant advances in the literature on stock options have been made because of 
researcher access to data from individual firms or data from consulting companies.  The obvious 
problem is that the firms may have little to “gain” by providing their data to researchers.  In one 
of our recent experiences (Hallock and Olson 2007a) we were turned down by as many as five 
companies (it could have been much worse) before we got access to the kinds of data we 
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needed.  In another (Hallock and Olson 2007b) we had a personal connection and an executive 
with a keen intellectual interest that helped us out.  This type of data collection is very time 
consuming.   In the end, we hope that firms will continue to share their data with researchers so 
more can be learned about options. 
 A second problem is that there are many publicly available data sources but the data are 
not yet “machine readable”.  This is a substantial barrier to researchers.  However, there have 
been considerable improvements in the kinds of data being collected.  For example, all “Form 4” 
data on stock and option transactions by senior executives in publicly traded firms are posted on 
the Securities and Exchange Commission web-site and commercial sources (such as Thomson 
Financial) are publishing these data as well.  
 All is not bad news, however.  An example is new requirements for firm reporting of 
executive pay packages.  The changes in the most recent proxy season (relative to the year 
before) are extraordinary.  Included among these changes is amazing detail on each individual 
option grant given to each individual executive.  These kinds of changes and easy to use 
machine-readable sources will hopefully contribute to our further understanding of employee 
stock options. 
 
IV. Case Study of Employee Exercise Decisions 
In this section we investigate the value of options to employees using a case study of 
option exercise decisions by over 2,000 employees in a large non-manufacturing firm.  The data 
we have include the entire 10 year exercise history for a sample of employees in the firm 
holding options that were granted on a common set of exercise dates.   All the options from a 
grant had the same strike price and expired ten years from the grant date and vested after two 
years. 9  These common features mean that on each day in the 96 month exercise window the 
same profit would be received by exercising an option from a common grant date but the profit 
varies from grant to grant because of different exercise prices. Regardless of the option grant 
                                                 
9 Two year vesting means the options could not be exercised until 24 months after the grant date. 
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date all option holders faced the same public information about the firm and the same 
exogenous macro-economic environment.  We also focused only on the exercise behavior of 
the 1,735 option holders who remained with the firm for the entire 10 year term of the option.  
This largely eliminates heterogeneity in option valuation because of anticipated turnover.  
Evidence from this grant provides the strongest and simplest evidence of substantial 
heterogeneity in the value of stock options to employees that is unrelated to turnover intentions. 
Daily data on employee exercise decisions for one large option grant were aggregated 
into calendar months and Figure 3 shows the distribution of first exercise times over the 96 
month exercise window.  This figure shows options were exercised over almost the entire 96 
months with about 1 percent of the sample exercising options each month after about 2 years 
except for the final months when exercise activity increased.     
Is the variation in exercise time in Figure 3 substantial?   As noted earlier, if employees 
valued options based on Black-Scholes the distribution of exercise times would have a single 
mass point equal to 1.0 in month 96; all the options would be exercised in month 96.  Or, if 
employees identically valued options at another value all of the exercise activity would have 
occurred in another month.  The data clearly reject the prediction of a single exercise date.    
The variation in exercise times implies substantial heterogeneity in the value employees 
place on holding their options. What more can be said?  First, the upward sloping dotted line 
and the right vertical scale in Figure 3 shows the profit an employee could have made by 
exercising an option divided by the option’s BSV (i.e., (SPk – EP)/ BSVTt=k, k=1,2…96).  This 
ratio approximates the portion of the option’s market value that is captured by exercising in any 
particular month rather than holding the option until the expiration date.  One minus this ratio 
also indexes the penalty employees incur because they cannot sell their options.  For example, 
for this option grant in month 20 an employee lost about 30 percent of the option’s value by 
immediately exercising the option.  The variation in the potential value of the option sacrificed by 
“early” decisions indexes the substantial variation in the value of options to employees.  
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While much of the exercise activity summarized in Figure 3 is “early” relative to what 
would be expected if employee stock options could be sold, the exercise pattern may be optimal 
for risk averse employees who can’t sell their options and who also have their careers, human 
capital and retirement income tied to the company.  Thus, the different value employees place 
on identical options may reflect differences in employee aversion with the least risk averse 
employees holding options until the end of the exercise window.  This hypothesis can be simply 
investigated by focusing on the 18.3 percent of the sample in Figure 3 that held their options 
until close to the end of the exercise window and exercised their options in months 94, 95 or 96.  
For this option grant the intrinsic value of the option at the start of month 94 was about $240 per 
option and the average option holder owned about 200 options.  Thus, almost 20 percent of the 
sample were willing to forego the $240 profit per option at the start of month 94 in order to 
capture the expected gain from holding the option for at most an additional three months.  What 
could employees expect to gain over this 3 month period and what does their behavior imply 
about their risk aversion and their expectations about the firm’s stock price over this three month 
period? 
 Assuming the stock price at the beginning of month 94 equals $28010 and the exercise 
price equals $40, the Black-Scholes value of an option expiring in three months is $240.70 
using reasonable values for the other Black-Scholes parameters.11  Thus, a diversified, risk-
neutral investor would be willing to hold their option for the remaining three months to collect the 
expected gain of about $.70/option or a return of 0.29 percent (.70/240.00) above what could be 
earned by immediately exercising the option.   
 The Black-Scholes value of the option at the end of month 94 can also be compared with 
the value from holding the option until month 96 for a risk averse employee who predicts the 
                                                 
10 Again, we do not report the precise values since we are unable to disclose the name of the firm.  The 
stock and exercise prices are the prices unadjusted for stock splits that occurred after the option grant 
date.  Therefore, these calculations show the payoff from exercising one of the original options that were 
granted to the employee and not an option that reflects the effects of the stock splits. 
11 This assumes the short-term risk-free interest rate equals 6 percent/year and the standard deviation of 
yearly firm returns equals .30.  These numbers are roughly representative of the firm and time period for 
this option grant. 
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firm’s stock price at the end of month 96 is based on the expected risk adjusted return the firm 
earns in the market and the variance in these returns.  Following the Hall and Murphy (2002) 
methodology, the dollar value to a risk averse employee from holding the option until the end of 
month 96 is the certainty-equivalent dollar value of the uncertain payoffs from holding the 
options another three months.  Risk aversion is measured by a parameter, RA, that could range 
from zero (risk neutral) to some small positive number (< 4).  In these calculations we adopt a 
common  mathematical representation of utility; the value or utility of “w” dollars to a risk-averse 
employee is (w(1-RA))/(1-RA).12   At the start of month 94 we assume employees predict that the 
stock price distribution from which the stock price at the end of month 96 will be drawn from is a 
normal distribution of annual returns (σ = .30) centered around the risk free return (6 percent) 
plus the risk premium investors expect to earn by holding this firm’s stock (14 percent).13  The 
utility function and the ending stock price distribution from these assumptions is used to 
calculate the certain cash payment employees would be willing to receive at the end of month 
93 that would make these employees indifferent between exercising the option and holding the 
option until the expiration day.  Since the average number of options/grant that employees 
received in our sample is about 200, the certainty equivalents were calculated assuming 
employees were deciding when to exercise 200 options in the final three months of the option’s 
term.  
Table 2 shows the results from this exercise for different levels of risk aversion.  The first 
row of numbers are based on the Black-Scholes model and report the expected value of the 
options at the end of month 96 assuming risk free returns are earned on the options is 
$244.23/option or $48,846 for 200 options.  Discounting this value back to the end of month 93 
gives the BSV in column 2. The remaining rows of the table give the certainty equivalent values 
for different levels of risk aversion where the final stock price is based on a draw from an annual 
return distribution N(.20, .32).   The second row reports the risk neutral evaluation of the options.  
                                                 
12 If ra=1 then U(w) = ln(w). 
13 The certainty equivalent values are computed by approximating the log-normal price distribution at the 
end of month 96 using a binomial price tree with 121 terminal prices. 
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This value is greater than the BSV because BSV assumes market traded options earn an 
expected rate of return equal to the risk-free interest rate (6 percent), while an employee owning 
an option that cannot be sold predicts the firm’s stock price increases at an expected  rate that 
includes the firm’s stock market risk premium (.06 + .14).  This difference leads to a larger 
expected gain from holding the option for the risk neutral employee at the end of month 93 than 
the BSV. She would exercise the options for a guaranteed payment of $50,871 at the end of 
month 96 or over $1000 greater than the comparable value of $48,846 for market traded 
options.  This example illustrates the important point that if employees were risk neutral and 
could not trade or sell their options, they could plausibly value employee stock options at more 
than their BSV.  
Economists generally believe that individuals are risk averse and there is no reason to 
believe the mid-level managers and professionals in this sample have different preferences.  
Therefore, the remaining rows in the Table report more plausible certainty equivalent values for 
different levels of risk aversion.   Hall & Murphy’s evaluation of past research leads them to 
conclude that a risk aversion parameter between two and three is a reasonable range for senior 
executives who have substantially more wealth than both the general population and the sample 
of employees included in this analysis.  The third row of Table 2 shows that for a risk aversion 
parameter of 1.0, the certainty-equivalent value at the end of month 93 for the 200 options is 
$49,383 or $1,383 more than the $48,000 profit that could be earned by immediately exercising 
the options.  The remaining rows show the certainty equivalents for other levels of risk aversion.  
At RA=2 the value of holding these options to the end of month 96 is $635 more than the value 
from immediately exercising them.  When RA= 3.0 the certainty equivalent value is $47,892 or 
$108 less than the value from immediately exercising the options.  We’d expect rational option 
holders who have a value of risk aversion of 3.0 to exercise at the end of month 93.  A risk 
aversion parameter of 2.85 gives a certainty equivalent value exactly equal to $48,000.  Thus, 
individuals less risk averse than this threshold are predicted to hold their options and those 
more risk averse would be predicted to exercise their options.  Since almost 20 percent of the 
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sample held their options into month 94, these calculations suggest a substantial minority of 
individuals owning options from this grant had a risk aversion parameter less than 2.85.   
The calculations in Table 2 show moderately risk averse employees could form rational 
expectations about the firm’s future stock price and justifiably hold their options past the 93rd 
month.  These rational evaluations are greater than the option’s BSV and could not be 
sustained if the options could be publicly traded.  If employees holding options at the end of 
month 93 with a risk aversion parameter < 2.8 were allowed to sell their options to the public, 
they would discover they had over-valued their options because the market would pay no more 
than the BSV.  This leads to the prediction that the heterogeneity in valuations implied by the 
dispersed exercise times in Figure 3 for the entire sample would disappear if these options were 
tradable as employee valuations converge to the BSV.  However, employee valuations could 
exceed BSV because employees cannot sell the options, they cannot observe the prices for 
options with comparably long terms (10 years) and they can’t borrow money from a bank using 
the options as collateral.  Any of these factors might cause employees to value options closer to 
BSV.  Because employees lack these  market signals to guide their exercise strategies,  these 
calculations and the behavior of these employees suggest they overvalue employee stock 
options  because they forecast the firm’s future stock price distribution using the observed, risk 
adjusted return earned by the firm’s shareholders and not the risk free return earned by owners 
of market traded options.   
Inferring the Value of Options to Employees From Their Exercise Decisions 
 It is possible to apply the basic ideas used to construct Table 2 and conduct a statistical 
analysis of exercise behavior for the entire sample that provides an estimate of employee risk 
aversion and the value of stock options to employees.  We define the Employee Value Function 
(EVFk,j,t) to be equal the value or utility (in dollars) to person “j” in month “t” from holding an 
option from grant “k” another time period.  “t” measures the months since the option vested and 
ranges from 1 to 96 because we study 10 year option grants with a two year vesting period.  In 
each month after vesting we assume the employee decides between holding the option another 
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period or exercising the option  by comparing the profit from exercising the option (the intrinsic 
value) with the value of holding the option at least another period.  Since SPt – EPk,j equals the 
certain cash payment the employee receives from exercising the option, the option will be 
exercised if this cash payment is greater than the monetary value to the employee of holding the 
option  In other words, the option is exercised in month “t” if 
(1a) tjkjkt EVFEPSP ,,, )( >−  
and the option is held another period if 
(1b) .)( ,,, tjkjkt EVFEPSP ≤−  
 
The left side of Eq. 1a is observed and equals the intrinsic value of the option or the profit that is 
made by exercising the option in month t.  The key parameter we wish to estimate  in this paper 
is the risk aversion parameter employees use to discount the uncertain future payoffs from 
holding the option.  Thus, the variable we focus on is the certainty equivalent value from holding 
the option implied by different levels of risk aversion.  The model underlying the calculations in 
Table 2 imply an option is held another period if 
(1c)  .),,),(,()( ,,,96, tjkttjkjkt rmrfEPSPfRACEEPSP
2−≤− σ
 
Where CE(.) is the certainty equivalent value of holding the option until it expires.  This  
depends on risk aversion (RA),  the distribution of the option’s intrinsic value on the option’s 
expiration date, the risk free interest rate (rft), the firm’s risk premium (rmt) and the variance in 
the firm’s returns (σt2).  Equation (1c) could form the basis for estimating a probit model of 
employee exercise decisions.  However, experimentation with different empirical specifications 
showed that this model fits the data poorly compared to specifications that included other 
covariates.  Therefore, the estimates we report are based on a model where the probability an 
option is exercised in period t equals: 
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where νk,j,t ~ N(0,σ2v). 
  
The variables included in the X matrix included a set of dummy variables indicating whether 
period t was within 2 months of a stock split, a dummy variable indicating whether the stock 
price surpassed the high price in the past 12 months, the differential between the stock price in 
month t and the high price in the previous 12 months and average firm returns in the previous 
three months and the next 6 months.  Using data from all the option grants in the dataset and 
not just the one grant used in Table 2 permits us to estimate a random effects probit model 
because most individuals in the sample held options from grants made on different dates in the 
early to mid 1990s.  
One other problem had to be addressed before the exercise decision model described 
by Eq (2) could be estimated using standard statistical software.  The certainty equivalent value 
of holding the option until expiration is a nonlinear combination of the parameter RA and the 
variables f(SP96,i – EPk,j), rft, rmt and σt2.   Using the utility function described above, the certainty 
equivalent value of holding the option until it expires equals exp[1/(1-RA)*ln(E(utility of holding 
option until expiration)*(1-RA))] discounted to the current period (t) at the risk free interest rate.  
The E(Utility of Holding Option until expiration) ~ ∑f(SP96,i – EPk,j) U(SP96,i – EPk,j) where f(SP96,i 
– EPk,j) is calculated from a discrete estimate of the log-normal stock price distribution at the end 
of month 96 using a 20 step binomial price tree and U(SP96,i – EPk,j ) = (SP96,i – EPk,j )(1-RA)/(1-
RA).  These steps mean RA cannot be directly estimated in a standard linear-in-the-parameters 
probit or linear probability model of exercise decisions because CE(.) is a nonlinear function of 
the risk aversion parameter we wish to estimate.  Therefore, we estimate the risk aversion 
parameter indirectly by selecting different values of RA and then calculate the certainty 
equivalent values implied by each risk aversion value for each observation in the data.  A 
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random effects probit models was then fit for each risk aversion value and the log-likelihood 
values for models computed using different values of RA were compared.  The risk aversion 
value that best fits the exercise decisions comes from the model with the maximum log-
likelihood value.  
Before describing the results, we briefly describe the sample and data. We have data for 
a sample of 2,180 middle managers and professionals who received multiple option grants at 
different exercise prices and at different points in calendar time from the studied firm.  The firm 
is a large, long established firm outside of manufacturing that has many tens of thousands of 
employees, billions of dollars in sales and locations throughout the United States.14  The 
employees in the sample received options at 13 different exercise prices on 13 different days in 
the 1990s with the majority of the grants occurring on two calendar dates where one exercise 
price was almost twice the magnitude of the other exercise price.15   The research summarized 
here uses data on the exercise decisions made by employees for options received in the first 
two grants an employee participated in during the 1990s where the options from the grants had 
vested before the fall of 2003.   
Table 3 contains descriptive statistics on the sample of option grants.   A total of  3712 
options grants were received by the 2180 employees and all but 1127 of these grants were 
exercised during the study period (e.g., were not right censored).  Twenty-five percent of the 
grants are exercised by the 34th month following vesting, the median exercise time is 69 months 
and the 75th percentile of the exercise distribution is 90 months.  The exercise hazard rate is 
relatively low and stable during the first 72 months and then increases sharply in the final year 
as unexercised options are exercised before they expire. Over the first 72 months of the 
exercise window an average of 1.11 percent of unexercised option grants were exercised for the 
first time in each month. 
                                                 
14 A condition for obtaining data from the firm included a promise that we would not reveal the identity of 
the firm.  Therefore, we cannot provide a more detailed description of the firm or make the data available 
to other researchers. 
15 In all cases the options were granted “at the money.” That is, the exercise price was equal to the firm’s 
stock price on the day of the grant. 
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 An interesting feature of the experience in this firm is that not all options from a grant 
were exercised in the same month.  In about 42 percent of the option grants where we observe 
the first exercise date (e.g., the exercise time is not right censored), the employee did not 
exercise all of the options in the grant.  On the other hand, overall 77 percent of the total options 
from the grants were exercised by employees on their first exercise date for a grant.  For this 
reason only the time until the first option from a grant is exercised is modelled.   
A final important feature of the sample is that it excludes managers who joined the firm 
during the 1990s or managers who received options during the 1990s but left the firm before the 
Fall of 2003.  Thus, these results describe the exercise decisions of long-tenured, stable 
employees who did not exercise options in anticipation of leaving the firm.  Excluding option 
recipients who left the firm during the study period simplifies the analysis because we don’t have 
to jointly model employee turnover and option exercise decisions.16   
Estimates of Employee Risk Aversion 
 Table 4 reports the log-likelihood values for models that include the certainty equivalent 
values of holding an option calculated from different risk aversion values.  For each RA value 
the log-likelihood values are shown for two models; one model that includes only CE(.) and the 
option’s intrinsic value and a second model that also includes the other covariates.17  Across all 
the values of RA, a comparison of the likelihood values for the two specifications show the 
model that includes CE(.) and the other covariates does a much better job of predicting exercise 
decisions than a model with just CE(.) and the option’s intrinsic value.  Therefore, the discussion 
focuses on the results in the second column of Table 4.   
                                                 
16 Firms often report that they provide options to improve employee retention.  Modeling option exercise 
decisions and turnover is difficult.  While options might reduce turnover, employees that are planning to 
leave the firm can be expected to exercise vested options before their departure.  This creates a positive 
correlation between exercise decisions and the probability of turnover in the “near term.”  Modeling 
exercise decisions and turnover behavior jointly would require a more elaborate competing risk 
framework and data on employees who did not receive options. 
17 The log likelihood value for the model that includes the option’s intrinsic value and the “X” variables but 
not CE(.) is -12,475.29. 
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 The results in column 2 show a clear pattern.  For the values shown in the Table, the log 
likelihood value is maximized at -12,409.44 in the model where RA equals 2.20 and deviations 
from 2.20 in either direction produce results with smaller log likelihood values.  Additional 
models were estimated for RA values around 2.20 and a RA value of 2.21 produced a maximum 
log likelihood value of -12,409.437.  This method of inferring RA does not produce an estimated 
standard error.  Note, however, the risk neutral specification implies RA=0 and for this model 
the log likelihood value is -12,455.24.  A likelihood ratio test comparing RA=0 and RA=2.21 
clearly rejects the hypothesis that these employees were risk neutral in their option evaluations.  
In addition, the results are consistent with the model describe by Eq. 2 since any of the 
specifications that includes CE(.) fit the data better than a model without CE(.) (logL = -
12,475.3).        
 The estimates summarized above imply all employees in the sample have identical risk 
preferences.  This is unlikely to be true.  Indeed, heterogeneity in risk aversion may be an 
important variable explaining the variability in exercise times observed in the data.  One variable 
we have that may be negatively correlated with risk aversion is an employee’s earnings in the 
firm.  Although this sample is a fairly homogeneous sample along earnings relative to the 
earnings distribution for the entire firm or for the U.S. labor force, the variation in wages in the 
sample may be sufficient to identify variation in risk aversion.   
The sample of employees was divided into wage quartiles based on real earnings in the 
first month an option held by an individual vested.  The empirical method used above for the 
entire sample was then replicated for each subsample to identify the value of RA that 
maximized the log likelihood value for each subsample.  The results are consistent with the 
hypothesis that low wage workers are more risk averse than higher wage workers.  For workers 
in the first quartile the best fitting model had an RA value of 2.34; the value for the second 
quartile was 2.18; 2.15 for the third quartile and 2.09 for the highest wage quartile.  Although we 
cannot statistically test whether or not these values are different from one another, the point 
estimates suggest variation in risk aversion in the predicted direction. 
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 The values of RA for models that best predict exercise decisions for the entire sample 
and each wage quartile can be used to calculate the certainty-equivalent value to an employee 
of holding an option until the expiration date.  These option values to employees can be 
compared to the value the market would place on the same options using Black-Scholes.  
Figure 4 shows these values 36-84 months after the option vests for a 10 year option with an 
exercise price of $15 and a current stock price of $50.  The figure shows BSV and the certainty 
equivalent values of the option for RA = 2.34, 2.21 and 2.09.  As expected, the uncertain payoff 
from holding the option means the option’s value declines as risk aversion increases.  For 
example, at 60 months after vesting or 7 years since the option was received, the value of 
holding the option is $38.61 when RA=2.34, $41.14 when RA=2.21 and $43.41 when RA=2.09.   
The other key point shown in this figure is that for these three risk aversion parameters 
employee places a higher value on holding the option than what Black-Scholes predicts the 
option could be sold for in the market.  As discussed earlier, this finding supports the point made 
from Table 2 that the exercise behavior of these employees implies they value their options at 
values in excess of the option’s BSV because of fundamental differences between employee 
stock options and market traded options.  Since employees cannot sell their options or use them 
as collateral to borrow money, they have no market signals to evaluate their worth to outside 
investors.  The estimates suggest employees value their options based on the firm’s expected 
returns rather than the risk free return the market uses to value options.  
This section focuses on how employee exercise decisions can be used to infer the risk 
aversion of employees and the value employees place on employee stock options.  These 
results have implications for many of the research and policy questions summarized in earlier 
sections of the paper.  For example, the cost of options to the firm depend on when employees 
exercise their options and the sensitivity of their exercise decisions to changes in the firm’s 
stock price.  Using Black-Scholes to cost options assumes options are held until the expiration 
date and the stock price at expiration is drawn from a log normal distribution.  Since these 
assumptions do not describe the option grants studied here, the BSV provides a poor estimate 
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of the cost of these options to the firm.  However, the empirical model of exercise decisions 
estimated here can be used to predict when employees exercise their options and the sensitivity 
of their exercise decisions to the firm’s stock price.  Although we save this exercise for later 
work, these estimates can be used to construct an estimate of their cost to the firm at the time 
options are granted.  
V. Open Questions and Conclusion 
In the past few years there have been dramatic shifts in public perceptions of and 
government regulations over how executives and other employees are paid in the United 
States.  Until just recently firms in the United States were not required to “expense” stock 
options in their balance sheets.   Now that U.S. firms have to report options as an expense in 
the balance sheet and not just in footnotes to financial statements, decisions to grant options to 
employees are likely to be subject to greater scrutiny.  While much has been learned about 
employee stock options over the past 10-15 years, numerous issues important to firms, policy-
makers and employees remain unresolved. In this paper we highlight some of these issues, 
discuss recent policy shifts affecting options and summarize the data sources on options 
available in the United States and elsewhere.  In the last section we present some of our own 
work on options that explore the value employees place on options which, in turn, has 
implications for the cost of options to the firm.   
 There are several new and continuing regulatory issues on the horizon that deal with 
compensation and stock options.  One that is interesting is the way that firms have been 
required to report on executive compensation.  Even though there has been considerable 
reform, there is still confusion about the way firms report options in the “summary compensation 
table”.  Firms are given wide leeway in the assumptions they can make about certain forms of 
compensation and how they report.   We anticipate more reforms and changes along these lines 
in the near future.   
Another is how to explicitly deal with employee stock options in the national accounts.  
As is it today, incentive stock options (ISOs) are not counted at all and the much more prevalent 
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non-qualified stock options (NSOs) are but as discussed above, there are considerable 
problems with how and when these data are reported.  Recent attempts by the BEA to examine 
this have been fruitful but there are still unresolved conceptual and data issues to be addressed. 
There is a series of other interesting questions on options where some progress has 
been made but more is to be done.  Some of these questions have been answered but many 
have solutions that are not yet known.  The questions include why do firms grant options (Hall 
and Murphy, 2003), do options retain employees (Hall and Murphy, 2003), do they motivate 
employees (Hall and Murphy, 2003), do they attract employees (Oyer and Schafer, 2005), why 
are they granted (in some cases) throughout the firm (Oyer and Schafer, 2005), will the recent 
FASB changes alter the way employees are paid (Bodie, Kalpan, and Merton, 2003), how well 
do options work, why don’t more firms use indexed options (e.g. relative performance evaluation 
work by Antle and Smith, 1986 and Gibbons and Murphy, 1990), are options efficient, what is 
the value employees place on options (Hall and Murphy, 2003, Hallock and Olson, 2007), what 
is the cost of options to the firm (Hallock and Olson, 2007), and what are issues surrounding 
options backdating (Lie, 2005 and 2007, Yermack, 1997)? 
 New work on stock options has the potential to have a practical impact on firms and the 
national accounts.  If firms do not have a credible estimate of how employees value stock 
options or other forms of compensation and firms alter the mix of pay, there could be 
consequences related to employee attraction, retention, and turnover and problems reconciling 
the national accounts.  We hope that our work is a useful step in the right direction of 
understanding more about compensation and employee stock options. 
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Table 1. 
Types of Data Sources (and Examples of Each) on Employee Stock Options 
 
Type Authors Comments 
Commercial Sources 
Execucomp 
 
Bergman and Jenter 
(2007) 
 
1,500 firms, details on options of top 5 execs from 1992-
2003 
 Chiambaran and Nagpurnanand (2005) Focus on repricing 
 Mehran and Tracy (2001) Review 
Equilar, salary.com   
Individual Firm 
Financial Records 
(firm-level) 
Aboody (1996) National Automation Accounting Research System NAARS) library of financial statement footnotes 
 Carpenter (1998) Average exercise times by firm 
 Core and Guay (2001) Non-exec option holdings, grants and exercises from 756 firms from 1994-1997 
Individual Firm 
Detailed Case Study 
(person-level) 
Armstrong, Jagolinzer, 
and Lang (2006) 10 publicly traded firms 
 Bajaj, Mazumdar, Surana, and Unni (2006) Two firms, enormous numbers of option grants 
 Hallock and Olson (2007a) 
Large firm outside of manufacturing, 13 grants to 2000 
middle managers over a decade 
 Hallock and Olson (2007b) Data from a different firm on pay mix, including options 
 
Heath, Huddart, and 
Lang (1996) and Huddart 
and Lang (1996) 
Individual grant and exercise data from seven firms 
Consulting Firm Data Farrell, Krische, and Sedatole (2006) Training data from equity compensation planning firm 
 Heron and Lie (2007) 7.2 million stock and options transactions 
 Landsman, Peasnell, Pope, and Yeh (2006) 
1,354 firm-year observations from S&P500 from 1997-
2001 
Perception Data from 
Surveys 
Farrell, Krische, and 
Sedatole (2006) Training data from equity compensation planning firm 
 Hodge, Rajgopal, and Shevlin (2006) Executives in class 
Government and 
Nonprofit Sources 
Kroumova and Sesil 
(2006) and Oyer and 
Schaefer (2006) 
National Center for Employee Ownership (NCEO) 
survey sent to plan administrators with plans in place – 
firm-level data for 600 firms 
 Oyer and Schaefer (2006) 
BLS establishment-level data from 1,437 
establishments 
International Data Ikaheimo, Kuosa, and Puttonen (2006) 14 plans, 6 firms, 27,808 transactions in Finland 
 Jones, Kalmi, and Makinen (2006) Option plans in all firms in Finland from 1900-2002 
 
Kato, Lemmon, Luo, and 
Schallheim (2005), and 
Pendleton 
644 stock option plan adoptions in Japan following 1997 
rule change 
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Table 2 
Values of 200 3 Month Options With An Exercise Price 
of $40 and A Current Stock Price Of $280 
 
    
E(U(SP-
EP)) 
  E(U(SP-EP))  Discounted 
  
Assuming 
No  
At Risk-
Free  
  Discounting  
Interest 
Rate 
     
Black-Scholes 
Value  $48,846.40  $48,140.00 
     
Risk Aversion  Certainty-Equivalent Values 
Parameter1     
     
Risk-Neutral  $50,871.20  $50,135.60 
     
1.0  $50,107.60  $49,383.00 
     
1.5  $49,727.60  $49,008.60 
     
2.0  $49,348.80  $48,635.20 
     
2.5  $48,971.20  $48,263.00 
     
3.0  $48,594.80  $47,892.00 
     
3.5  $48,219.60  $47,522.20 
1. U(x) = W(1-ra)/(1-ra) for ra ≠ 1 and U(x)=ln(x) for ra = 1.   
The risk neutral interest rate is 6 percent, the firm's risk premium is 
14 percent and the standard deviation of firm returns is .30. 
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                                                                    Table 3  
                                             Summary Statistics on Exercise Decisions 
 
 
Number of Employees Receiving Options 2180 
  
Number of Option Grants 3712 
  
Number of option grants where time to 1127 
       first exercise date is censored  
  
Mean options/grant 1302 
  
Mean hazard rate/month 0.0128 
  
25th Percentile of Time to 1st exercise date 
(months) 34 
Median time to first exercise date (months) 69 
75th Percentile of Time to 1st exercise date 
(months) 90 
  
Options exercised on first exercise date  0.765 
      as fraction of options in the grant  
  
Fraction of first exercise decisions where  0.576 
      100% of options in grant were exercised  
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Table 4 
 Log Likelihood Values for Models that Include Certainty Equivalent Values of Holdings 
an Option for Different Levels of Risk Aversion 
   
Log Likelihood Values For Models of Employee 
Exercise Decisions 
Using Different Risk Aversion Values 
   
 Model Includes: 
Risk Aversion Intrinsic Value, CE(.)  Intrinsic Value, CE(.), X 
   
Risk Neutral -12,488.67 -12,455.240 
   
0.50 -12,484.42 -12,452.822 
   
1.00 -12,473.70 -12,443.847 
   
1.50 -12,461.13 -12,433.029 
   
1.75 -12,451.98 -12,424.170 
   
2.00 -12,442.12 -12,413.851 
   
2.20 -12,437.94 -12,409.443 
   
2.25 -12,438.13 -12,409.661 
   
2.30 -12,438.95 -12,410.499 
   
2.50 -12,447.87 -12,419.073 
   
3.00 -12,487.56 -12,453.232 
   
3.50 -12,520.71 -12,475.175 
Notes:  A model with just the option's IV and the X variables has a  
Log likelihood value of -12,475.29.  
   
The six variables in the X matrix include the differential between 
the stock price in the month and the 12 month stock price high,  
the average firm stock return over the previous three months, the  
average stock return over the next six months and separate 
dummy variables indicating whether the stock price in the month  
exceeds the 12 month price high and indicators for two  
months prior to a stock split and two months after a stock split.  
   
The log likelihood value is maximized (-12,409.437) for a model where RA=2.21. 
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